The competition between the United States and China is intensifying, following recent events. While US President Biden's tour to Asia and recent remarks regarding Taiwan soured relations, Foreign Minister Blinken's outline of China's strategy ushered the rivalry into a new phase.

Blinken's remarks at George Washington University could be interpreted as acknowledging the United States' hegemonic global competition with China in the twenty-first century.

Actually, for a long time, China has always been viewed as a threat in US official discourse. Since 2018, China has been portrayed as a revisionist power and a superpower that challenges the current international order in strategic documents on national security.

This rhetoric, which got more abrasive throughout Trump's presidency, was carried on by Biden as well.

Biden went so far as to say that the United States' conflict with China is the most critical geopolitical test of the twenty-first century.

The concept of China as a threat, which is obvious among Republicans in the United States, has lately expanded among Democrats, and the claim that China is a global rival has begun to be acknowledged at the country level.

In such a situation, Blinken's statement might be seen as a doctrinal endeavour to establish "strategic clarity." Following allegations of "strategic confusion" as a result of Biden's remarks on Taiwan, the US is attempting to adjust its geopolitical approach to the area.

Blinken's speech focuses on China's strategy, with the themes "invest, align and compete."

The United States is primarily interested in establishing an economic foundation for competing with China. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework was also introduced as part of this. Besides, at the ASEAN conference in Washington last week, a $150 million investment was pledged to the area.

These initiatives make up the "invest" portion of China's strategy. It's uncertain if these efforts to undermine the Belt and Road Initiative's impact in the region will be successful.

The United States seeks a smooth alignment with its regional partners and allies in order to provide a counterbalance to China's investment. Boutique security organisations such as QUAD and AUKUS have already been mobilised to help pave the way. These structures are now expected to launch a coordinated containment.

It is believed that by organising the strategy's economic and political foundations, a more suitable level of competitiveness can be attained.

As a result, a three-pronged strategic competition model, namely economic, political, and military, has been established.

It is possible to define Blinken's speech as the 'Biden doctrine'. Like the Truman doctrine, the conception is predicated on the idea that the United States is under threat by China.

While China is seen as the most serious long-term danger, the speech emphasises that a "new cold war" is not intended. It's worth noting that Blinken alludes to the rules-based system that emerged following the two World Wars.

Besides, he says, however, emphasise the importance of coordinated action by a shared network of allies against China, adding, "We cannot maintain this system alone."

According to Blinken, "China is the only country with both the intention and the economic, diplomatic, military, and technical power to remake the world order."

Blinken claims that China is attempting to dominate future technology, but concedes that the United States is lagging behind. Henry Kissinger is similarly adamant that the technology condition is critical in global rivalry.

Blinken also cited China and Russia's "boundless" relationship, as well as the combined patrol of Chinese and Russian nuclear bombardment warplanes during Biden's visit to Japan, in his address.

"We are ready to expand our direct contact with Beijing. We sincerely hope that this will be possible. We cannot, however, rely on Beijing to alter its course." The question of "state intentions' ambiguity" is raised by Blinken's statements.

Based on these comments, we may conclude that the Biden administration favours offensive realism.

When Blinken declares, "We will alter the strategic environment around Beijing," he also confesses that his aims to avoid a new cold war are ambiguous.

Blinken stated that they could not trust Beijing and that they would build the strategic environment around them, but they are not seeking for a new cold war.

Furthermore, Blinken stated in another section of his address, "We will protect our interests. "We have the strongest army in the world," he declares.

When Blinken argues, "...we don't compel countries to make decisions, we provide them options," he puts the region's states in a difficult position.

"We are changing our military spending from weapons meant for 20th-century battles to longer-range, easier-to-carry asymmetric systems," Blinken said in announcing the transition to "integrated deterrence."

Taiwan comes to mind when Blinken states, "We will help our friends and partners strengthen their asymmetrical capabilities."

Although Blinken's speech has various inconsistencies, he briefly asserts that China is the USA's worldwide competitor and that the US would endeavour to prevent China from succeeding. As an approach, it suggests increasing asymmetrical capacity rather than traditional capabilities.

Despite his objections, this rhetoric implies that the United States is prepared for a new cold war with China. It should be emphasized, however, that we are in the midst of a ‘hybrid cold war’ due to its asymmetrical characteristics.

These systemic attitudes, known as the Biden doctrine, are not unique to the Trump period. As a result, we can see the theory in question as a state discourse.

In contrast to the Trump era, it is feasible to argue that Biden can better unite regional allies and provide institutional depth to the competition.

Despite Blinken's assertion that they have placed diplomacy at the forefront of US foreign policy, engagement in the area is not at the intended level. This constraint will also raise concerns about the strategy's functionality.

Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework and ASEAN summits are insufficient to mobilise regional partners and allies. More efforts are required to avert unwelcome catastrophes by investing in essential infrastructure and forming alliances to promote supply chain security.

In this regard, the Biden administration is competitive but less aggressive.

These systemic principles, known as the Biden doctrine, are likewise akin to the Truman doctrine. The Truman doctrine was a groundbreaking collection of concepts that declared the division of the world into two blocs and the start of the Soviet-American conflict.

Today's political situation may not be comparable. Examples can also differ.

However, the fact is that the United States and China are swiftly approaching a chaotic and asymmetrical era in which cold war tendencies coexist with strong competitiveness.

Dr.Hüseyin Korkmaz. The author is a researcher focusing on China and geopolitics in the Asia, primarily related to the US-China relations.